Gro ran 2 rounds of Votium incentives in April for the PWRD3CRV meta pool on Curve with 69,000 GRO and 35,000 GRO tokens respectively.
Outcome of the incentive system was encouraging. PWRD3CRV liquidity grew $15mn to reach $28mn, with PWRD TVL in the pool increasing from $9mn to $13mn. This increased utilisation ratio and Vault yield, driving total protocol TVL up from approximately $40mn to $54mn.
To continue growing the pool depth and TVL, further incentivization for the PWRD3CRV Curve gauge through Votium or other may be required. This proposal asks the Gro DAO to allocate up to $600k for this purpose.
So far mostly liquid GRO tokens were used for Votium incentives, this proposal explicitly permits also the usage of Gro Treasury’s stablecoin assets to buy back GRO tokens from the open market (up to the allocated $600k) to use for incentives.
Implementation can take various forms using a mix of GRO, Vault, PWRD (acquired with USDC) for PWRD3CRV incentives. This vote gives DAO contributors, Grwth Lbs and Wojak, the mandate to devise implementation plans so that Gro incentives are utilised to the highest efficiency possible.
Proposal that Gro DAO allocates up to $600k to incentivize CRV allocation to the PWRD3CRV meta pool through Curve gauge. The sum could be funded by either GRO, USDC, PWRD, or Vault tokens in Gro Treasury; DAO contributors, Growth Lbs and Wojak, will experiment to best deepen liquidity and increase TVL of Gro protocol.
A suggested implementation is using the stablecoin assets in Gro Treasury to buy back GRO tokens; it is possible to use USDC directly or through first depositing USDC for Gro Vault tokens (GVT) and using them to buy GRO tokens for incentives. This increases Gro TVL and Vault supply at the same time, which increases the capacity to mint more PWRD. Alternative implementation could be providing LP tokens such as PWRD/GRO on Uniswap v2 to incentivize allocation of CRV rewards to the PWRD3CRV pool if Votium or similar platforms allow. It would require experimentation to understand what combination would provide the highest capital and operational efficiency.
The allocation would remain in Gro Treasury until deployed via the multi-sig for PWRD3CRV incentivization. There is no fixed timeline or min/max amount for each round of incentivization.
When the funds run out, the multi-sig would transfer no more funds (in excess of the amount “borrowed” from marketing spend - see details in second part of the risk section) to Votium or similar platforms without another DAO governance approval. DAO contributors will need to return to DAO governance for further allocation. If such incentivization is discontinued as they are no longer deemed productive for PWRD liquidity and/or Gro protocol TVL, the remaining sum in Gro Treasury will be free to be used for other purposes. If the funds are not being deployed for 6 months, they will also no longer be earmarked for PWRD3CRV incentives.
1. Risk that there is insufficient funds in the Gro DAO Treasury due to other commitments
There are currently $25mn assets in Gro Treasury; $600k only accounts for 2.4% of all treasury assets. Gro tokenomics also allows for up to an additional 8mn Gro DAO tokens to be minted by the treasury if required. Combining the above, it is unlikely that other near term commitments would take up enough funds to render it impossible to afford the $600k incentives. In the event that there are not enough tokens of a particular type, the multisig can swap for or deposit to mint the required tokens.
2. Risk that what remains of the allocated funds are insufficient to achieve the goals of deepening PWRD3CRV liquidity and increasing protocol TVL
Mitigated by the ability for DAO contributors in seeking DAO governance in allocating more funds to incentivise for votes towards the Curve Gauge of the PWRD3CRV pool. In the scenario where there is not yet another DAO governance vote in time to support the next round of incentivisation, the multi-sig could be instructed to allow for a +10% flexibility (i.e. transfer an additional 10% of the funds allocated i.e. 10% x $600k = $60k) while a vote is waiting to be wrapped up. This would be considered as “borrowed” from the marketing budget.
3. Risk that the funds are no longer efficient in deepening PWRD3CRV liquidity or increase protocol TVL
There is a cap of $600k for incentivisation. Should they prove unproductive, DAO governance will have the full rights to decline further allocation to incentivise PWRD3CRV Curve gauge.
After 7 days in the community forum, if there are no major unresolved objections or comments then the proposal will be posted as a vote at https://vote.gro.xyz where it will remain live for a further 7 days.
We will use dedicated discord channels and the bi-monthly community call to discuss the proposal so that all DAO members are aware of the proposed changes and have the opportunity to consider and discuss ahead of voting.
Should we allocate up to $600k from the DAO to incentivise Curve gauge allocation to the PWRD3CRV pool?