GRFC: Require GRO tokens to be locked to vote, and define off-chain governance processes (Meta-governance update, sub-proposal 1)

[GRFC] Sub-Proposal 1: Require GRO tokens to be locked to vote, and define off-chain governance processes


  • Raambo
  • Graadient
  • Jaypow
  • KD
  • Henrystats
  • Beckley

Related discussion(s)

Voting Options
Sub-proposal 1 proposes to:

  • 1a) Allow only locked GRO tokens (i.e. vesting tokens that are still not vested) to vote
  • 1b) Ratify what should be governed by who
  • 1c) Ratify off-chain governance process

DAO members can either vote:

  • FOR: approve the sub-proposal
  • AGAINST: do not approve the sub-proposal
  • ABSTAIN: no opinion on this proposal

Type (Proposed Changes)

  • On-chain action: allow only locked GRO tokens (i.e. vesting tokens that are still not vested) to vote
  • Off-chain action: Ratify what should be governed by who
    • Define current and proposed distinctions of what should be governed by who, for;
      • DAO votes resulting in on-chain actions
      • DAO votes resulting in off-chain actions
      • Pod/ Committee-Level Operations resulting in on-chain actions
      • Pod/Committee-Level Operations resulting off-chain actions
      • Emergency functions
  • Off-chain action: Ratify off-chain governance process
    • Request for Comments (RFC):
      • Signalling vote: quorum of 15 votes and 50% passing rate
      • Duration: 6 days
      • Mandatory use of RFC template
    • Snapshot proposal:
      • Proposal threshold: 175,000 (vesting) GRO
      • Duration: 5 days
      • Quorum: 350,000 (vesting) GRO and 50% passing rate
      • Mandatory use of proposal template

Gro DAO governance should move on-chain, enabling votes to be held and executed by smart contracts autonomously. Accordingly, as part of a wider meta-governance update, the following three sub-proposals will be proposed, for the DAO to proceed:

  1. Require GRO tokens to be locked to vote, and define off-chain governance process
  2. Approve an Emergency multi-sig and define its powers
  3. Implement on-chain governance via a governor contract and define its powers, and define on-chain governance process

This post focuses on sub-proposal 1, which needs to be passed before sub-proposals 2 and 3 can be raised.

1a) Allow only locked GRO tokens (i.e. vesting tokens that are still not vested) to vote

To further enhance the alignment of DAO members (GRO token-holders) with the long-term success of Gro DAO, a new governance model should be implemented. This model would allocate greater voting power to members who have longer commitments, as indicated by their vesting (locked) GRO tokens. Similar to how Gro DAO’s current vesting bonus mechanisms work, this incentivises longer-term commitments by giving members greater influence in exchange for them continuously re-vesting their liquid or already vested GRO tokens.

This governance model is inspired by Curve DAO’s popular veCRV model, which is widely recognised to align the long-term interests of the DAO with that of DAO members (token-holders), by basing DAO members’ influence on their vesting governance tokens. It requires participants to lock up (vest) governance tokens for a set period, while the vote aggregator contract only counts currently vesting tokens (tokens still locked in the vesting contract), towards votes. The proportion of tokens that are vested increases linearly from 0% on day 1 to 100% on the last day of the vesting period, so unless vested tokens are put back into vesting, a DAO member’s vote in governance decreases linearly from 100% of their vesting tokens on day 1 to 0% on the final day.

Gro DAO already has GRO token vesting contracts for community members, founding team members, advisors and seed investors, that reward those who lock up their GRO for a longer period (see more on Gro DAO’s 1 year community vesting period here).

Accordingly, to implement this change (if approved by the DAO), the voting weight for liquid and already vested GRO on the vote aggregator contract would be set to 0, so that only the DAO members, team members, advisors, and seed investors who are vesting their GRO tokens would have voting rights. This modification ensures that the interests of DAO members are better aligned with the long-term success of the DAO.

1b) Ratify what should be governed by who

It is important for the DAO to understand the proposed governance processes going forwards, including what requires DAO governance (especially if and when automatic on-chain governance execution is enabled).

To strike a balance between decentralisation and efficient execution, Gro DAO adopts a governance-minimised approach. This involves simplifying and hard-coding contracts to limit the need for governance, and relying on broad-based governance for convex decisions while handling concave decisions at the execution layer (the pod/committee level). By doing so, the DAO is able to maintain agility and speed while ensuring that critical decisions receive the appropriate level of oversight.

Table 1 (see here) illustrates what is currently governed and implemented by whom, and what should be governed and implemented by whom over time. It is worth noting that even if and when on-chain governance (sub-proposal 3) and an emergency multi-sig (sub-proposal 2) are configured, not all actions will be configured for automated execution immediately.

See TABLE 1 for a high-level breakdown of the actions that can be governed and executed by various DAO pods/committees, contracts and/or addresses.

1c) Ratify off-chain governance process

As seen in Lido and Yearn’s governance, there can be two parallel governance processes that can be taken, depending on whether the nature of proposed action is on-chain or off-chain (as seen in Table 1).

The following steps illustrate the requirements to raise and vote on a proposal in the scenario where only vesting GRO counts towards votes. When on-chain governance cannot be used to implement the resulting actions (either because on-chain governance is not approved by the DAO or because the respective proposal would not result in an on-chain action), the off-chain governance process result (though technically non-binding) is considered as the final vote:

  1. Discuss in Discord at #governance channel
  2. Write a Gro Request For Comments (GRFC) on [image]Gro DAO Forum, following these guidelines on writing GRFCs, and use the poll feature to conduct an informal signalling vote
  3. After at least [6 days] of GRFC, if feedback has been implemented and there is a general consensus (as determined by GRFC feedback and by at least [15 members] participating in a passing signalling vote) that the proposal should be taken to vote, addresses with [175,000+ vesting or delegated vesting GRO tokens] (~0.5% of circulating GRO Supply), or whitelisted addresses; can initiate the proposal on Gro DAO’s Snapshot, using this Proposal Description Template
  4. The vote would be live for at least [5 days] for off-chain voting on Snapshot, and would need to meet a quorum of [350,000 vesting GRO] (~1% of circulating GRO Supply) and a passing rate of over [50%]
  5. A successful vote would have [3 days] of timelock for implementation (if applicable), allowing time for emergency multi-sig to act if there’s a malicious attack

See further details here for the definitions and logic behind proposed parameters and delegation.

When on-chain governance can be used to implement the resulting actions, the on-chain result can be considered as the final vote. However, this on-chain governance process will only be formally voted on during sub-proposal 3, because until then, Gro DAO would still be entirely governed through off-chain governance.


1a) Allow only locked GRO tokens (i.e. vesting tokens that are still not vested) to vote

  • The voting weight for liquid and already vested GRO on the vote aggregator contract would be set to 0
  • This will require a low-effort single transaction to be executed (~20 minutes of prep), with negligible gas fees

1b) Ratify what should be governed by who

1c) Ratify off-chain governance process

  • Have agreed upon process documented in Notion
  • Change Snapshot proposal threshold from 1,000,000 to 175,000 GRO
  • Change Snapshot quorum from 50,000 to 350,000 GRO
  • Add the with-delegation strategy to the Gro Snapshot space

Benefits (Pros)
1a) allow only locked GRO tokens (i.e. vesting tokens that are still not vested) to vote

  • Ensures greater alignment between the DAO and its members
  • Further incentivises longer-term commitments to the DAO
  • Reduces risk of governance attack ahead of on-chain governance implementation becasue: as more direct power is held by DAO token holders, the more important it is to have a protected system. Currently, 1 locked/vesting GRO token, 1 unlocked/vested GRO token and 1 claimed/liquid GRO token all count as one vote. This leads to a potential attack scenario where a user buys a large amount of GRO, creates an unfavourable proposal, votes for the proposal, and then dumps their GRO tokens before negative consequences of the proposal can impact the value of the GRO token.
  • Enables Gro DAO to lower proposal thresholds (from 1,000,000 to 175,000 GRO on Snapshot) which also increases and encourages greater voter participation

1b) Ratify what should be governed by who

  • Greater clarity on current and future governance processes
  • Further streamlining of DAO operations
  • Understanding on Gro DAO’s progressive decentralisation journey
  • Sets context for sub-proposal’s 2 and 3

1c) Ratify off-chain governance process

  • Greater clarity on off-chain governance process
  • Lower threshold to make proposal
  • Enabling voter delegation makes it easier for DAO members to meet proposal thresholds, and for votes to meet quorum thresholds; and would give voters the chance to delegate to an informed and competent representative (where helpful), to increase total voter participation

Downsides (Cons)

  • Greater operational overhead
  • More complicated processes that need to be understood by DAO members
  • Higher quorum thresholds need to be met for future proposals to be passed

Technical documentation

Submission date and next steps

  • Date of Submission: 2023-05-12T23:00:00Z
  • Move proposal to Snapshot if RFC feedback is implemented and there is sufficient support: 2023-05-21T23:00:00Z

Signalling Vote
Please indicate below whether you are FOR, AGAINST; or have no opinion (ABSTAIN); on this sub-proposal.

  • FOR: approve the sub-proposal
  • AGAINST: do not approve the sub-proposal
  • ABSTAIN: no opinion on this proposal

0 voters

This RFC will be open for comments over the next [6 days]. If no substantial changes are required, it will then be open for voting for another [5 days].


I support this proposal. Having locked GRO tokens as a prerequisite for voting shows that members have a vested interest in the future of Gro, and can prevent exploitation.


thanks for the feedback :slight_smile:

The proposal to lock GRO tokens for voting is a necessary move that will make sure DAO members are truly invested in Gro DAO’s long-term success. Plus, by clearly defining who’s in charge of what and setting up off-chain governance processes, Gro DAO can run smoother and take steps towards becoming more decentralized. It’s all about making things clearer, more efficient, and giving the community a stronger voice! I and my locked GRO tokens fully support the proposal.


Thank you Raambo and the rest of the Authors for setting this up, A very well organised Proposal I must say. But in as much as we want voters to be aligned with the Long term success of this DAO, we should understand it as a step by step process. I am concerned about the Snapshot Proposal Quorum (350,000 vesting GRO). Although tthe Vesting TVL is <$9m and getting 350,000 GRO on snapshot should be possible, What if in a case we don’t get up to 350,000 GRO votes and fail to reach this quorum. What is the next step? What If we fail to reach Quorum more than 3 times?

So far former votes; we’ve been having votes with less than 200,000 GRO even tho that was Vested and Unvested GRO.
What makes this different? Why do you think we can achieve 350,000 GRO quorum? How did we come about this figure? Why did we choose this figure?

There have been really low engagements on calls, forum votes even snapshot votes , compared to a yr ago we had over 100 voters. The efforts of the People Pod is noticeable and there have been improvement compared to months back, but what If there’s is less turnouts on votes than expected. Is this going to be the Fault of the People Pod initiatives not creating so much awareness or would it be because the quorum was set too high at an early stage in Gro DAO development?

Thanks for your feedback and comments @kndlexi.

Firstly, to set context lets first ensure that the figures mentioned are correct:

  • Currently, there are a total of 18m GRO tokens in vesting (across the community, team, and investor vesting contracts), which has a market value of ~$1.37m.
  • The total GRO in circulation (i.e. that is either liquid or vesting, and could be put towards vesting) is 38M GRO, which has a market value of ~$2.88m

In striving towards a more autonomous decision making and execution process, we need to strike a balance between fluidity in governance and protection against governance attacks. Accordingly, the parameters/thresholds proposed for the off-chain governance and on-chain governance processes (further detail included in these links) have been informed by Tally’s guidance “on parameters for balancing between ease of passing proposals and security against malicious proposals”; as well as by analysing proposal threshold, quorum, timelock, voting period, and voting delay values adopted by other DeFi protocols that adopt similar on-chain governance processes (including Inverse DAO, Origin DAO, Idle DAO, Angle, Lido, Aave). For example, for the the quorum threshold value, most of these DAOs set the figure to be between 5-20% of their circulating governance tokens. In comparison, the proposed off-chain quorum threshold value for Gro DAO is ~1% of the 38m GRO in circulation.

The scenario you mention of governance paralysis (i.e. not meeting set thresholds) is plausible, but by enabling voter delegation, voters can choose to not be as active in the governance process and still have their votes counted! This should enable us to more easily meet set thresholds. However, we need to ensure that there is enough education and guidance on topics such as vesting and delegation, such that the proposed changes actually work effectively! Also, these levels can be changed in the future (or even now) if there is consensus and justification to do so. :slight_smile:

Regarding your last point, I don’t think we can or should point fingers at specific stakeholders in case we don’t achieve the voter turnout we expect. The People Pod will try their best to set the right parameters and educate the community, but ultimately, DAOs are collective effort and decisions made are done through consensus.