Although the snapshot is already live, I would like to help the community understand the DAO’s involvement in options 2 and 3 in case either is the outcome chosen by voters. I think this could use more clarification than what has been given so far.
tl;dr - If options 2 or 3 are chosen, the DAO continues to exist and can vote to do whatever it chooses. For example, it could soon after propose a GRFC for a voluntary redemption of GRO tokens, a plan that was raised by community members in the past week. It could also propose a different approach to the parameters of the treasury redemption, or anything else it wants. It would be wise to determine its path forward before pod grant periods come to an end, but this is up to the DAO.
The rest of this post will summarize some arguments for and against the most popular alternative paths that were discussed in the community, retouch an important point about option 3, and finish with some final reminders for all DAO members.
Arguments for the voluntary redemption path
- It would allow anyone with GRO to cash out from the treasury and exit, similar to option 1.
- Others can remain GRO holders & DAO participants by choice.
- Benefits users who may want to cash out partially while continuing to have a limited stake in the DAO.
Arguments against or disclaimers about the voluntary redemption path
- Specifics about the percentage of the treasury to allocate are unclear.
- Ambiguity regarding the architecture of the new redemption mechanism.
- What happens if too much of the treasury is depleted by early exits?
- What happens to vesting GRO if a final redemption is pursued after 6 months?
Arguments for a different approach to the treasury redemption & distribution
- Choose a retroactive snapshot to reduce the ability for RFV speculators to redeem a share of the treasury at the expense of historical GRO holders.
- Calculate the GRO distribution differently to account for unfinished GRO emissions and voting power that has allowed team & investors to vote with “future” vesting GRO.
- Add multipliers for addresses who have demonstrated commitment to the DAO (by voting, choosing to vest rewards, participating in the LBP, etc.).
Arguments against a different approach to the treasury redemption & distribution
- Disagreements about what “fair practices” are.
- Some historical precedents were and weren’t established by the DAO for situations like this, and those that were established are being followed.
- Certain concessions have already been extended to community members.
- There are complexities involving snapshots & accounting for various GRO token iterations.
- Questions about the viability of pursuing altered parameters in the wake of recent voting power shifts (this applies to any future DAO proposals in options 2 and 3).
NOTE - These are simplified overviews and can be expanded on in the future if necessary.
What can the DAO do in Option 3?
In the case of option 3, the text of the GRFC suggests two potential outcomes, A and B, and is presented overall as an extremely risky path. In the Snapshot text for option 3, it states:
“The DAO will no longer have any technical developer capabilities within its Pod contributors as of October and an orderly unwinding of either protocol or the DAO will technically not be possible.”
However, a reminder that the DAO can determine what it wants to do - the above claim is not a foregone conclusion. For example, a wind-down and treasury redemption with different procedures or calculations could still be proposed by the DAO at any point if option 3 is chosen.
Finally, Option 1 is still the most direct path to redeeming GRO tokens and winding down the protocol and the DAO, for those who agree with the processes and parameters described in the GRFC.
If anyone would like to know the current voting power distribution, wint3rmute’s GRO Vesting G2 Dune dashboard, specifically the Total Vesting GRO pie chart, is one place to begin. Note that “Rewards” refers to GRO that has been distributed via liquidity pools, airdrops, and the vesting bonus pool - it includes community members as well as addresses owned by other entities. For those who want to see the voting power exactly at the time of the snapshot that was taken for vote 37, you will need to backdate the dashboard’s data to this block: Ethereum Blocks #18127164 | Etherscan. Please do your own research beyond this point.
I hope everyone has taken the time to inform themselves about the proposal and various perspectives before making a decision. The DAO welcomes all votes during this critical juncture.